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PROTECTING ELITES:
AN ALTERNATIVE TAKE ON How UNITED STA TES V. JONES
FITS INTO THE COURT'S TECHNOLOGY JURISPRUDENCE
Tamara Rice Lave*
This Article argues that the Supreme Court's technology
jurisprudence can be best understood as protecting the privacy
interest of elites. After providing an overview of the major
technology cases from Olmstead to Kyllo, the Article focuses on
the recent case of United States v Jones. The Article does not
contend that the Court intended to protect elites, but instead posits
that this motive likely operated at a more unconscious level
because of the Justices' greater relative affluence and elevated
social position.
I. INTRODUCTION
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a
search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our
movements for a month? You think you're entitled to do that under
your theory?
MR. DREEBAN: The Justices of this Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes.
(Laughter.)
Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Ph.D.
Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California Berkeley; J.D.,
Stanford Law School; B.A., Haverford College. This Article benefited
immensely from the comments of Scott Sundby, Charlton Copeland, members
of the University of Maryland law faculty (especially Danielle Citron, Mark
Graber, David Gray, Lee Kovarsky, Amanda Pustilnik, Max Steams, Michael
Van Alstine) and participants in the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology Symposium on U.S. v. Jones: Defining a Search in the 21st Century
(Jan. 25, 2013). Special thanks to Melanie Spencer for outstanding research and
the editors at the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology for helpful
editing.
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MR. DREEBAN: Under our theory and under this Court's cases,
the Justices of this Court when driving on public roadways have no
greater expectation of-
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is yes, you could
tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our cars,
follow us for a month; no problem under the Constitution?'
Psychologists have long observed that an individual's ability to
identify and empathize with another's situation plays a key role in
how he perceives a situation.2 Studies have suggested that judges,
not surprisingly, are subject to this basic human trait in their
judging, ' although perhaps not as overtly as in Chief Justice
Roberts' above questioning. This Article argues that the Court's
Fourth Amendment rulings involving technology have been
particularly influenced by the Justices' ability or inability to
identify with the citizens who are being monitored. As a result,
' Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259).
2 See Lynda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape
Judgments: An Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 402, 409-10 (1997) (discussing the literature on
juror empathy); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in
Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998); Scott
Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy
Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003).
See Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
July 7, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/magazine/
12ginsburg-t.html?pagewanted=all (interviewing Justice Ginsburg about Justice
Rehnquist's decision in Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003), in which the Court ruled that the Family Medical Leave Act applies to
state employers for both male and female employees). In the interview, Justice
Ginsberg stated:
That opinion was such a delightful surprise. ... I was very fond of my old
chief. I have a sense that it was in part his life experience. When his
daughter Janet was divorced, I think the chief felt some kind of
responsibility to be kind of a father figure to those girls. So he became
more sensitive to things that he might not have noticed.
Id.; see also Adam Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does
Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues (July 26, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that judges with daughters consistently vote
in a more pro-woman fashion on gender issues than judges who only have sons),
available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/daughters.pdf.
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whether the Justices were able to empathize with the individual
under surveillance has determined not only what activity is
protected under the Amendment but also who is protected. And, as
will be demonstrated, this has meant that, until recently, the
Court's Fourth Amendment rulings have shown a bias towards
regulating only those government activities that could affect
"elites." ' This, however, may be changing, not because the
Court's empathies are changing, but because, as we begin to see in
United States v. Jones,' new technologies are making everyone,
elites and non-elites alike, vulnerable to the Government's
scrutiny.
In Jones, the Supreme Court held that attaching a Global
Positioning System ("GPS") monitor to a car and tracking its
movements for twenty-eight days constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment.6 Although the Justices unanimously agreed
that the Government's conduct was a search, they could not agree
on the reason why. The result was a majority opinion authored by
Justice Scalia resting on the common-law trespassory test, 7 a
concurring opinion by Justice Alito contending that the long-term
monitoring was unreasonable under Katz v. United States' even
though the same monitoring conducted on a shorter term would not
4 Christopher Slobogin makes a similar argument in The Poverty Exception to
the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REv. 391 (2003). However, he does not
discuss technology cases, nor does he make the more radical argument that the
Court actually changes Fourth Amendment jurisprudence if doing so is
necessary to protect elites.
s 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
6 id.
7 Id. at 949-52 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device
on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a 'search.' It is important to be clear about what
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical
intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted... . [A]s we have discussed, the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.").
8389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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have been,' and a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor
essentially agreeing that it was a search under both rationales.o
Only Sotomayor was willing to tangle with the tough technology
cases sure to come in the not-so-distant future." Although she did
not hash out how those cases should be decided, she did question
whether, in light of commonplace practices in the digital age like
disclosing the websites people visit to their internet service
providers, "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties." 2
Many have criticized the reasoning in Jones. Supreme Court
Justices," scholars, 4 and pundits'" alike knocked the majority's
9 "[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person's movements on public
streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society as recognized as
reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
'oId. at 954 ("I join the Court's opinion because I agree that a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, '[w]here as here,
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area."); id. at 956 ("I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. I do not regard as
dispositive the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits of GPS
monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques.").
" Id. at 955 ("With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of
duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory-or owner
installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.").
1Id. at 957.
'3 Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) ("In sum, the majority is hard pressed to
find support in post-Katz cases for its trespass-based theory.").
14 See Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, the Narc, and the Very Tiny
Constable: Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 113,
117 (2012) ("Four decades of legal scholarship and jurisprudence consequently
understood Katz as replacing a property-based view of Fourth Amendment
rights with one based on privacy. . . . It is a measure of the audacity of the Jones
opinion that Justice Scalia does not acknowledge the revisionism of its
reasoning."); Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United
States v Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 327 (2012) ("Although he splices
enough hairs to make it work in his opinion, the precedent that he wrangles had
464 [VOL. 14: 461
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reliance on the trespass doctrine, which they argued had been
jettisoned after Katz.16 At the same time, Justice Alito's opinion
has been chided for being too conclusory" and for flatly ignoring
existing precedent from United States v. Knotts, " in which the
Court held that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another." " Although Justice
Sotomayor has been lauded for asking the tough questions that the
fairly settled that property law no longer stood as a gateway to Fourth
Amendment protection.").
15 Dahlia Lithwick, Alito v. Scalia, SLATE (Jan. 23, 2012, 6:38 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/j urisprudence/2012/01/u s_vj
onessupremecourt justices alito and scalia brawl over technology and-pri
vacy_.single.html ("Maybe it's enough simply to know for now that at least five
justices have a good sense-and a whomping, healthy fear-that what's
barreling down the road requires more than merely wondering what would have
happened in a horse-drawn carriage.").
16 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959 ("Katz v. United States finally did away with the
old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a Fourth Amendment
violation.").
1 Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 327 (2012) ("Justice Alito's analysis is cryptic, in part because this
section of his opinion cites no authority."); Murphy, supra note 14, at 332 ("The
greatest disappointment of the concurring opinion, therefore, is its refusal to
even attempt a theory of Fourth Amendment applicability that would have
buttressed the same ultimate holding, but with a test that might apply beyond the
particular facts of this case."); Lithwick, supra note 15 ("It's not clear that the
court served the reasonable person at all today by handing down an opinion that
gives no sense whatsoever of when and how a warrant would be required for
government surveillance in the hands-free world of the 21st century, or how
long such surveillance could endure before privacy concerns are raised. . .
8 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
19 Id. at 276; Jones at 953-54 (arguing from Knotts that "even assuming that
the concurrence is correct to say that '[t]raditional surveillance' of Jones for a 4-
week period 'would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and
perhaps aerial assistance,' our cases suggest that such visual observation is
constitutionally permissible.").
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others avoided, she has been faulted for merely hinting at the way
they should be resolved.20
In the wake of Jones, it has become difficult to determine when
the use of technology will constitute a search. Law enforcement
officials do not know what degree of tracking creates Fourth
Amendment concerns, and so, in an abundance of caution, the FBI
has turned off almost three thousand GPS devices.21 The problem
is not complying with Justice Scalia's majority opinion, but the
ambiguous rationale put forth by Justice Alito. While giving a
presentation at the University of San Francisco in early 2012, FBI
General Counsel Andrew Weissmann said:
I just can't stress enough . . . what a sea change that is perceived to be
within the department. . . . I think the court did not wrestle with the
problems their decision creates . . . . Usually the court tends to be more
careful about cabining its decision ... [but] [g]uidance which consist[s]
of "two days might be good, 30 days is too long" is not very helpful.22
Some scholars have tried to fill in the gap by articulating
comprehensive theories for this brave, new, post-Jones world.2 3
20 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 337 ("In short, [Justice Sotmomayor's]
opinion is the only one that contains any trace of vision, even as she admits to
struggling with how precisely to realize it.").
21 Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off 3,000
Tracking Devices, ABC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:40 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/supreme-court-ruling-prompts-fbi
-to-tum-off-3000-tracking-devices/.
22 Id.
23 David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Technology-Centered Approach
to Quantitative Privacy 5 (Aug. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2 129439 ("Taking
inspiration from information privacy law, we propose as an alternative a
technology-based approach under which the threshold question would be
whether a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad programs of
indiscriminate surveillance that intrude upon reasonable expectations of
quantitative privacy. If it does, then its use amounts to a 'search,' and should be
subject to the crucible of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, including the
warrant requirement."); see also Susan Freiwald, First Principles of
Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3, 17-20 (contending that
the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be replaced with a test that
looks at the following four factors: how hidden or secretive the surveillance is,
how intrusive it is, whether it is indiscriminate and how continuous it is.); Peter
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Yet no one is sure how the Court will address the difficult cases
that are certain to arise in the future-such as what happens when
the Government uses information that a person has voluntarily
made available through his cellphone or via an OnStar navigation
system that a driver has knowingly installed in her vehicle.
These are interesting and important questions, but they will not
be addressed in this Article, except in passing at the end. The goal
here is much more modest. Unlike other articles, this Article will
argue that the Jones case does fit in with prior technology cases.
In making this argument, this Article will look beyond the
rationale put forth by the Court to the animating principle that
lurks beneath. Specifically, this Article will contend that the
technology cases from Katz to Jones can be best understood as
reaching resolutions that best protect the interests of elites, even if
this requires changing existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
to do so.
By "elites," this Article refers mostly to those who enjoy
greater relative affluence and elevated social position. Although
the Justices may not all have been born into wealthy families,24
their current income places them above the top five-percent
B. Swire & Erin Murphy, How To Address Standardless Discretion after Jones
1 (Ohio St. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 77, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2 122941 ("In summary,
courts would test reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment by examining the
adequacy of and compliance with procedural safeguards. In a range of settings
involving new technologies, the state would need to craft reasonable safeguards
against standardless discretion, and then comply with those safeguards.").
Susan Freiwald had the foresight to propose this four-part test for evaluating
when electronic surveillance implicated the Fourth Amendment years before
Jones was decided. Freiwald, supra.
24 See, e.g., ALEJANDRO PORTES, ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC
INQUIRY 84-85 (2010) (noting that "[p]owerless individuals may thus improve
their class position through the selective marketing of rare and desirable skills.
Any skill that, for any reason, is in high demand becomes relevant as a class-
conferring resource. It can be the surgical ability of a physician, the legal
acumen of a lawyer, the sensibility and originality of a painter, or the batting
prowess of a baseball player. . . . All that matters is that skills are of such a kind
that they hold the potential to lift their possessors across the fundamental class
divide in capitalist society.").
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income bracket,25 and as long as they retire no earlier than age
sixty-five after fifteen years of service, they will continue to earn
their full salary for the rest of their lives.26 More significant than
their salaries, however, is the fact that Supreme Court Justices are
elites in terms of their more extensive education, broader political
influence, and more rarified social connections.2 7 As Robert A.
Carp, Ronald Stidham, and Kenneth L. Manning put it:
25 In 2013, the Chief Justice will earn an annual salary of $223,500 and
Associate Justices will earn $213,900 per year. Robert Langley, Annual
Salaries of Top US Government Officials, ABOUT.COM,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/governmentjobs/a/Annual-Salaries-Of-Top-Us-
Government-Officials.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). This places them between
the top five-percent ($159,619) and the top one percent ($380,354) of American
salaries. How Much Money Do the Top Income Earners Make?, FINANCIAL
SAMURAI, http://www.financialsamurai.com/2011/04/12/how-much-money-do-
the-top-income-earners-make-percent/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
26 Laurent Belsie, John Paul Stevens: Supreme Court Retirees Keep Lifetime
Pay, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Business/2010/0409/John-Paul-Stevens-Supreme-Court-retirees-keep-lifetime-
pay.
27 "Judges occupy an elite subculture, which is characterized by greater
education and relative affluence." MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 6 (Oxford University Press 2004). This is true, to different degrees,
for each of the Justices who decided Jones. Justice Scalia grew up with a highly
educated father and other successful and well-educated relatives, and went to
Georgetown University and Harvard Law School. David Niose, No Agenda? A
Humanist View of Justice Scalia, THE HUMANIST, Mar./Apr. 2010, available at
http://www.thehumanist.com/humanist/10 mar apr/Niose.html. Both Justices
Thomas and Sotomayor came from extremely humble beginnings and went on
to attend Holy Cross and Yale Law School and Princeton and Yale Law School,
respectively. Jodi Kantor & David Gonzalez, For Sotomayor and Thomas,
Paths Diverge at Race, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/07/us/politics/07affirm.html?pagewanted=all& r-0. Justice Alito's
father was an Italian immigrant and high school teacher (who later went to law
school and became executive director of New Jersey's bill-drafting Office of
Legislative Service), while his mother was a former schoolteacher and principal;
Alito went to Princeton and Yale Law School. Allegra Hartley, 10 Things You
Didn't Know About Samuel Alito, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2007/1 0/01/1 0-things-you-didnt-
know-about-samuel-alito. Justice Roberts was the son of a steel executive and
attended Harvard College and then Harvard Law School. John Fox, Biographies
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America's jurists come from a narrow segment of the social and
economic strata. To an overwhelming degree they are offspring of
upper- and upper-middle-class parents and come from families with a
tradition of political, and often judicial, service. They are the men and
women to whom the U.S. system has been good, who fit in, and who
have succeeded.28
The focus of this Article will be on the bias of the Court's Fourth
Amendment technology jurisprudence towards protecting elites.
Carp et al. suggest that it is the Justices' status as the top jurists in
the country that leads to this partiality, for "[s]eldom bitten is the
hand of the economic system that feeds them. .. . [M]ost judges
are basically conservative, in that they hold dear the traditional
institutions and rules of the game that have brought success to
them and their families." 29 The resulting bias transcends even
of the Robes: John Glover Roberts, Jr., PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
supremecourt/future/robes roberts.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). Justice
Breyer was born into a middle-class family and to a father who served as legal
counsel for the San Francisco Board of Education. Stephen G. Breyer, THE
OYEZ PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/justices/stephen g breyer (last visited Apr.
1, 2013). He later married into a well-established family of the British
aristocracy and thus possessed great wealth. Id. He attended Stanford
University, Oxford University (as a Marshall Scholar), and Harvard Law
School. Id. Justice Kagan was "the middle child in a New York family whose
intellectual dynamism and embrace of liberal causes provide a window onto the
social milieu and culture that shaped her." Lisa W. Foderaro & Christine
Haughney, The Kagan Family: Left-Leaning and Outspoken, N.Y. TIMES (June
18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/nyregion/20kagans.html?
pagewanted=all. She attended Princeton University, Oxford University and
Harvard Law School. CNN Library, Elena Kagan Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 19,
2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/19/us/elena-kagan-fast-facts.
Justice Kennedy's father was a well-established lawyer, and his mother was
involved in many local civil activities; Kennedy went to Stanford University and
Harvard Law School. Anthony Kennedy, USA TODAY, http://conlaw.usa
today.findlaw.com/supreme court/justices/kennedy.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2013. Justice Ginsburg's father sold furs and was later a haberdasher; she
attended Cornell University and graduated from Columbia Law School.
Danielle Burton, 10 Things You Didn't Know About Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.usnews.com/news/national/
articles/2007/10/01/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-ruth-bader-ginsburg.
28 ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 403 (8th ed. 2011).
29 id
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political affiliation, as "America's elite has its fair share of both
liberals and conservatives, but it does not have many who would
use their discretionary opportunities to alter radically the basic
social and political system." 30 Interestingly, in this brave new
world of ever-pervasive technological surveillance, those with
high-tech expertise may not need the Court to protect them from
government monitoring because they will be able to harness
cutting edge software to protect their privacy."1 Unfortunately, due
to the "digital divide," the poor are significantly less likely to have
access to these sorts of privacy protections and thus will need to
rely upon the Court.32
In making this argument, there is no contention that the Court
intended to protect elites; to the contrary, this motive likely
operated at a more unconscious level. Indeed, Justice Scalia
recognized as much in a concurring opinion in Minnesota v.
Carter" in which he argued that because the Katz test was not
tethered to anything concrete, it has become a proxy for the
Justices' own expectations of privacy: "In my view, the only thing
the past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is
that, unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective) expectations of
privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"
30 id.
31 Surveillance Self-Defense, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://ssd.eff.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) ("The Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) has created this Surveillance Self-Defense site to educate the
American public about the law and technology of government surveillance in
the United States, providing the information and tools necessary to evaluate the
threat of surveillance and take appropriate steps to defend against it.").
32 A 2012 Pew Internet Project Report found that, "[o]ne in five American
adults does not use the internet. Senior citizens, those who prefer to take our
interviews in Spanish rather than English, adults with less than a high school
education, and those living in households earning less than $30,000 per year are
the least likely adults to have internet access." Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith,
Digital Differences, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Digital differences
041312.pdf.
13 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
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bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that
this Court considers reasonable."34
Two important caveats before beginning: First, this argument
will not be aided by in-depth interviews with Justices or their law
clerks. Although an ethnographic approach would undoubtedly be
useful, it is not entirely necessary. There is an extensive literature
demonstrating how unconscious biases affect people's perception,
judgment, and behavior." Thus, this project has value even if the
cited animating principles cannot be proven as true. Second, this
Article presents preliminary thoughts with the hope they will spark
conversation and be developed at greater depth in the future.
II. ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
It is fitting to begin with the grandfather of all of these cases,
Olmstead v. United States.36 The Fourth Amendment states, in
relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."" Determining whether conduct
constitutes a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes is cardinal,
albeit complex," because it places important constraints on the
34 Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("The Katz expectation-of-privacy test
avoids the problems and complications noted above, but it is not without its own
difficulties. It involves a degree of circularity, and judges are apt to confuse
their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable
person to which the Katz test looks." (citations omitted)).
3 Adam Benforado, Frames oflnjustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J.
1333 (2010); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes
Are You Going to Believe: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV 2035 (2011).
36 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("[T]he antecedent
question whether or not a Fourth Amendment 'search' has occurred is not so
simple under our precedent.").
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Government.39 If conduct is a search, then the Government, with
some exceptions, must first obtain a warrant from a neutral
magistrate and must then conduct the search reasonably. 0 If
conduct does not constitute a search, however, the Government is
free to engage in it without these limitations.4'
In Olmstead, a divided Court held that tapping the telephone
lines of a house and gathering information by listening to the calls
over a period of months did not constitute a search because the
police never penetrated the walls of the house to access the phone
lines.42 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, concluded that
"[t]he amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was
no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry
of the houses or offices of the defendants."4 3
In a famous dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the majority
was interpreting the Fourth Amendment too narrowly:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
39 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 119, 122
(2002) (discussing the process by which the Court determines what constitutes a
search).
40 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (" 'Over and again this
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires
adherence to judicial processes,' and that searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions" (citations omitted)).
41 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) ("The installation and
use of a pen register . . . was not a 'search,' and no warrant was required.");
Colb, supra note 39, at 122 ("Absent a search, police may observe the thing that
is 'exposed' without having to obtain a warrant or otherwise justify their
observations.").
42 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
43 Id. at 464.
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of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.4
Although it took almost forty years, Brandeis was finally
vindicated. In Katz v. United States, 45 the Court held that
electronically listening to and recording a defendant's conversation
in a public telephone booth constituted a search even though the
police had not penetrated the walls of the phone booth:
[T]he reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. We
conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . ha[s] been so eroded
by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.46
Instead, the Court trumpeted a more expansive notion of the Fourth
Amendment, one directly shaped by Brandeis' legendary dissent.47
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," 48 and so it
was that the protection of a person's privacy became the
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated what would
become the test for this new doctrine: A person would have to
show both that he had manifested a true subjective expectation of
privacy, and that the expectation of privacy was one that society
was prepared to deem reasonable.4 9
What is worth considering is why this more expansive view of
the Fourth Amendment was ever conceived of in the first place.
After all, as Justice Black points out in his dissent in Katz, "The
first clause protects 'persons, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' These words connote the
idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable
44 Id. at 478-79.
4' 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46 Id. at 353.
47 See id. at n.6 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) for the proposition that a "person's general
right to privacy" is his "right to be let alone by other people"); see infra notes
52-53 and accompanying text.
48 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
49 Id. 361.
SPRING 2013]1 473
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
of being searched, seized, or both." SO The seeds for Justice
Brandeis' famous dissent can be traced back to The Right to
Privacy," which he co-authored with Samuel D. Warren in 1890.52
Published thirty-eight years before his dissent in Olmstead, it was
here that Brandeis first argued that the law recognizes the right of
people to be "let alone.""
Warren and Brandeis contended that "[p]olitical, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society."54 The specific changes that Brandeis and Warren had in
mind were the ability of newspapers and magazines to publish
intimate details about people's lives, writing that "[i]nstantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.' "" They then tried to find a legal principle with which to
guard against these technological invasions, and they dismissed
potential sources such as "breach of confidence, and of an implied
contract." 56 Yet they didn't feel that these sources provided
enough protection, so they turned to the right to privacy, which
they argued should be extended from "personal writings and any
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions"" to "the
'
0 Id. at 365.
51 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 47.
52 See Robert B. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations,
64 MICH. L. REv. 259, 260-61 (1965) ("In 1928, long after the 1890 article,
Brandeis wrote his celebrated dissent in Olmstead v. United States, in which he
objected strongly to the majority ruling that messages passed along telephone
wires are not within the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. .. . In emphasizing the urgent necessity of protecting
against 'every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual,' Mr. Justice Brandeis borrowed extensively from what Mr. Brandeis
had written thirty-eight years earlier." (footnote omitted)).
5 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 47, at 193.
54 id
5 5 Id. at 195.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 213.
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personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relations,
domestic or otherwise."58
And what motivated this passion for privacy? Samuel D.
Warren married the daughter of a senator, and as a result, intimate
details about his life, and more significantly, the life of his wife
and her family were published in newspapers." In an interesting
article published in the Michigan State Law Review, Amy Gadja
sought proof for what many had believed-that the impetus for
The Right to Privacy was gossip mongering by the press about
Warren. 60 After examining over sixty articles about Warren's
family, she concluded that "Samuel D. Warren married into what
he would surely consider a media maelstrom. Indeed, if Samuel D.
Warren had not married a United States senator's daughter, 'The
Right to Privacy' might not have been written."" It is worth
emphasizing what an important point this is: Core Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was challenged, and the meaning of a
search was changed, because Samuel D. Warren, and by proxy
Louis Brandeis, had an unpleasant experience with a form of
technology not protected against by existing law-the type of
"paparazzi" that would be directed almost exclusively at a member
of the elite.
III. BEEPERS
In the Court's next major tangle with technology, the petitioner
fared less well. In United States v. Knotts,62 the Court held that
monitoring beeper signals from a vehicle on public streets did not
constitute a search because "a person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
58 Id.
5 See Amy Gajda, What Ifs and Other Alternative Intellectual Property and
Cyberlaw Stories: What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn't Married a Senator's
Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to "The Right to
Privacy ", 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 35, 44-59 (2008).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 42.
62 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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his movements from one place to another." 63  In Knotts, the
Government suspected codefendant Armstrong of buying
chemicals to manufacture methamphetamine." The owner of a
chemical company gave the Government permission to install a
beeper inside a chloroform container that was then sold to an
unsuspecting Armstrong.' Agents monitored the canister by both
visual and beeper surveillance, and when they lost sign of it, they
used the beeper to locate it outside of the petitioner's cabin.66
Using information that they obtained through this surveillance as
well as other sources, the police applied for and received a warrant
to search the cabin. 67 Inside, they found a clandestine drug
laboratory, which led to the prosecution of Knotts and his
codefendants." Knotts's motion to suppress the evidence was
denied and he was subsequently convicted.69 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari."o
All of the Justices agreed that the use of the beeper in this case
did not constitute a search." This was not particularly surprising,
considering how the Court has treated cars as less deserving of
Fourth Amendment protection,7 2 and more significantly, because of
the holding in Katz that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
63 Id. at 281.
6Id. at 278.
65 Id.
66 id
67 Id. at 279 (discussing that the officers relied on the "location of the
chloroform derived through the use of the beeper and additional information
obtained during three days of intermittent visual surveillance of respondent's
cabin" to secure a search warrant).
68 Id.
69 id
70 Id. at 280.
7' Id. at 276.
72 See id. at 281 ("We have commented more than once on the diminished
expectation of privacy in an automobile: 'One has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effect. A car has little
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both
its occupants and its content are in plain view.' " (citations omitted)).
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Amendment protection."" As previously discussed, the notion that
public conduct does not warrant Fourth Amendment protection
would pose a problem for Justice Alito and those joining with him
in his analysis of Jones.74 Yet, as much of a problem as Knotts
would pose, it also offered guidance into how the Court might
handle more intrusive technologies. For example, although
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall concurred in the decision,
they wrote separately to emphasize what would become a
harbinger of things to come-the fact that technological
enhancement could pose a problem: "Although the augmentation
in this case was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the
use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially
sensitive concerns."75
Furthermore, in response to Knotts's argument that upholding
the GPS would allow the Government to engage in "twenty-four
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country . .. without judicial
knowledge or supervision,"76 Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of the
majority, wrote:
[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent
envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable. Insofar as respondent's complaint appears to be simply that
scientific devices such as the beeper enabled the police to be more
effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional foundation.
We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and
we decline to do so now. 77
One year later in United States v. Karo," the Court held that use of
a beeper did constitute a search because the beeper had allowed the
police to locate a canister inside a house. 79 The reason why the
Court came out differently in the two cases is that in Knotts, the
beeper only enabled the police to monitor defendants in public
n Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
74 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
7 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 287.
76 Id. at 283.
77 Id. at 284.
7 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
79 Id.
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places, whereas in Karo, the beeper allowed the police to in effect
see inside the house, something they would not have had the right
to do without a warrant.o
IV. AIRPLANES AND HELICOPTERS
Twenty years after Katz, the Court grappled with another
technology in the Fourth Amendment context-this time,
airplanes. The Court had previously held that the curtilage of a
home is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, which means
that the police are not allowed to enter it to without a warrant or
exigency. 8 The Court had also held that "what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."8 2 The question
remained: Were an officer's naked-eye aerial observations of a
person's curtilage admissible without a warrant?
In California v. Ciraolo," the police received an anonymous
telephone tip that Mr. Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his
backyard.84 The Santa Clara police attempted to look into the yard,
but they could not see over the six-foot outer fence and the ten-foot
inner fence that Mr. Ciraolo had erected." Getting creative, the
police secured a private airplane and flew over the yard." From a
distance of one thousand feet, they were able to see marijuana
plants, and they used these observations to secure and execute a
warrant, and then successfully prosecute Mr. Ciraolo for
cultivation of marijuana. " Although the California Court of
Appeals held that this search violated the Fourth Amendment, the
8o ld. at 715. The Court concluded that Karo was "not like Knotts, for there
the beeper told the authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts' cabin. The
information obtained in Knotts was 'voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look ... '" Id.
8 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
82 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
8' 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
84 Id. at 209.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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Supreme Court disagreed." In an opinion authored by Chief
Justice Burger, the Court held that naked-eye observation from an
aircraft lawfully operating did not violate an expectation of privacy
that was reasonable." "In an age where private and commercial
flight in the public airways is routine," Burger wrote, "it is
unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants
were constitutionally protected from being observed with the
naked eye from an altitude of 1000 feet."90
Similarly, in Florida v. Riley,9 1 the Court held that naked-eye
observation from a helicopter lawfully hovering9 2 some four
hundred feet over a person's fenced in backyard did not constitute
a search. " Just as in Ciraolo, law enforcement received an
anonymous tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property.94
When the sheriff was unable to look into the greenhouse from the
ground, he took to the sky." Although the Florida Supreme Court
had held that this action constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In an opinion
authored by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, the plurality wrote:
In this case, as in Ciraolo, the property surveyed was within the
curtilage of respondent's home. Riley no doubt intended and expected
that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the
precautions he took protected against ground-level observation.
Because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open,
however, what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing
from the air. . . . We would have a different case if flying at that
altitude had been contrary to law or regulation. But helicopters are not
bound by the lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other
8Id. at 210. The California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for
review. Id.
89 Id. at 215; see also id at 211-12 (suggesting that respondent might not have
even passed the first hurdle in Katz).
90 Id. at 218.
9' 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
92 Justice White used the more neutral term of, "circled twice over
respondent's property at a height of 400 feet." Id. at 448.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 448.
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aircraft. Any member of the public could legally have been flying over
Riley's property in a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet and could have
observed Riley's greenhouse. The police officer did no more. 96
Although Justice O'Connor agreed that there was no search in this
case, she wrote separately to emphasize that in determining
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in aerial
observation, the issue was not whether the helicopter was where it
had the legal right to be under FAA regulations, but instead
"whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at
which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that
Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not
'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." ' "
Although the Court didn't acknowledge it, judges and people
like them would never be subject to such observation. Mr.
Ciraolo's house was worth approximately $23,529 in 1982, which
was almost one-fourth the median value of a home in California at
that time." Mr. Riley, in turn, was living in a mobile home in a
rural area.99 Because both were living in a flight path, studies
show that they had less desirable and thus lower priced houses.'oo
96 Id. at 450-51.
9 Id. at 454.
98 The author's research assistant found Mr. Ciraolo's address (2085 Clark
Avenue) in an article from the San Jose Mercury News. Brad Kava, Supreme
Court Pot Case Figure Arrested Again, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 27,
1985, at IB, available at NewsBank, Record No. 8502020740. On February 6,
2013, she contacted the property assessor in Santa Clara, California. The
property assessor stated that the value of Mr. Ciraolo's was $22,172 in 1979.
Telephone interview with Santa Clara County Assessor (Feb. 6, 2013). To
calculate its value in 1982, the property assessor stated that a two-percent
increase per year should be added, which equaled $23,529. Id. The property
assessor told the research assistant that the house was sold in 2005 for $750,000
by the Mary Ciraolo trust. Id According to the census, the median price of a
home in California was $84,500 in 1980. Historical Census of Housing Tables:
Home Values, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 6, 2012), http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html. Assuming the same two-
percent increase in value per year, the median price of a home in California
would have been $87,913.80. Thus, 87,913.80/23,529 is equal to 3.74.
99 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
100 See M. Rahmatian & L. Cockerill, Airport Noise and Residential Housing
Valuation in Southern California: A Hedonic Pricing Approach, 1 INT'L J.
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Thus, although the curtilage around a home is a constitutionally
protected space, the curtilage around a home where the residents
are wealthy enough to be able to live outside of the flight path is
worth more under the Fourth Amendment than the curtilage of a
home that is within the flight path.
V. THERMAL-IMAGING DEVICES
In Kyllo v. United States,' the Court was faced with deciding
whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a home from
a public street for the purpose of detecting relative amounts of heat
in the home constituted a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 102 An agent with the Department of the Interior
suspected that Mr. Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home.'
He knew that indoor marijuana growers often relied on high
intensity heat lamps, and so he used the thermal device to see
whether the heat emanating from the house was consistent with
such use.' 04 The scan showed that two areas were particularly hot,
and the agent then used those findings to help secure a warrant that
eventually led to Mr. Kyllo entering a conditional guilty plea while
he litigated the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.' 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled against Mr. Kyllo, holding
that the action in question was not a search under either prong of
ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 17, 25 (2004) ("Homes located within 5,000 meters (3.10
miles) of a large airport have an average price that is estimated to be 4% to 10%
lower then homes located greater than 5,000 meters from a large airport. Homes
located within 5,000 meters of a small airport have a mean price that is 1.75% to
7.5% lower than homes outside the 5,000-meter perimeter."); see also Daniel P.
McMillen, Airport Expansions and Property Values: The Case of Chicago
O'Hare Airport, 55 J. OF URB. ECON. 627 (finding that homes located around
Chicago O'Hare airport were sold at almost a ten-percent discount if located
within a sixty-five decibel noise contour band).
'o' 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
102 Id. at 29.
1o3 id.
104 Id.
05 Id. at 30.
481SPRING 2013]
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
the Katz test. 106 Luckily for Mr. Kyllo, the Supreme Court
disagreed. In a decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that the thermal gun violated Mr. Kyllo's reasonable expectation of
privacy because it revealed the contents of the house. 107 In so
doing, the Court rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment only
protected "intimate" activities: "In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes." 10 Furthermore, Scalia wrote, even
though the thermal gun only revealed differential heat in this case,
it had the capability of revealing much more, as "[t]he Agema
Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each
night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath-a detail
that many would consider 'intimate.' ""0' Consequently, the Court
held that the use of the thermal heat device did constitute a search,
stating that "[w]here as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant."" 0
Scalia's comment about the lady in the sauna certainly reflects
a concern that would exist only among the "upper crust" (after all,
how many people have saunas in their homes), but the problem is
more fundamental. The telling part of Kyllo is not the lady, but the
caveat of "us[ing] of a device that is not in general public use.""'
The implication of this statement is that if many people had
thermal heat devices, then it would no longer be reasonable to
believe that the activities revealed by the device inside the home
were private because people would be able to anticipate and
protect against it.
106 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27
(2001).
107 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
'
0
' Id. at 37.
'
09 Id. at 38.
"0 Id. at 40.
"' Id. at 38.
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This perspective was reflected during oral argument in Kyllo.
In an exchange between Justice Scalia 112 and Kenneth Lerner
(appearing on behalf of Danny Lee Kyllo), Scalia repeatedly
emphasized how a person's reasonable expectation of privacy was
related to the measures he could take to protect himself:
QUESTION: Why don't your reasonable expectations include
technology? Why don't your reasonable expectations include the fact
that you know there are such things as binoculars, so that even if your
house is a long distance away from where anybody else can stand, you
pull your curtains if you want privacy because you know people have
binoculars?
MR. LERNER: Right.
QUESTION: And so also you know there are things such as
thermal image, and so if you're really concerned about that degree of
privacy, I'm sure there are means of preventing the heat escape from
the house, and therefore preventing that technology from being used.
Why do we have to assume that we live in a world without technology?
MR. LERNER: We don't have to assume that we do, Your Honor,
but technology has the ability to penetrate into our private lives, and
that's the problem.
QUESTION: Yes, it does and we have the ability to protect our
private lives as well if we really have expectations of privacy.' 13
But who exactly could do something about it? If someone is a
renter, she is unlikely to spend tens of thousands of dollars putting
a new roof on a house or investing in extra insulation. And even if
she is a homeowner, the odds are that she is unlikely to have the
extra resources to do something about it. In other words, the Court
has set up a test that provides maximum protection for the rich and
does not even see the implications for the poor.
112 Since the transcript did not contain the name of the Justice, the author
asked her research assistant to listen to the oral argument. Oral Argument at
20:19, Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (No. 99-8508), available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2000-2009/2000/2000 99 8508. In so doing, the research assistant
concluded that it was Justice Scalia and then confirmed her conclusion by
listening to an interview with Justice Scalia. CNN, Justice Antonin Scalia Talks
About Roe v. Wade, YOuTUBE (July 18, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=RjMhS2u-Pk. On a separate occasion, the author then confirmed her
research assistant's conclusion by repeating these steps.
113 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (No. 99-8508).
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VI. GPS MONITORING
As detailed in this Article, up until this point, the more widely
available a specific technology, the less protection it received
under the Fourth Amendment. 114 This approach explains the
Court's holdings in Ciraolo and Riley that it was not a search for
the Government to look for contraband while flying, or even
hovering, over curtilage, but it was a search for the police to use a
thermal gun in Kyllo.'" Such a distinction would surely baffle the
average person because he would undoubtedly find it more
invasive to have a government official hovering four hundred feet
above his yard in a noisy helicopter than pointing a thermal device
at his house for a few minutes from across the street.
Logically, it follows that the "general public use" approach
always affected the poor more than the rich because the rich had
the ability to protect themselves against the incursions of
technology by living in houses, building taller fences, and buying
better blinds. New technology, however, has changed all that: The
rich cannot shield themselves in the same way that they could from
binoculars. Unless elites plan to live off the grid, never own a
smart phone, or never buy a new car, they cannot protect
themselves from being monitored by GPS.
In Jones, the Court grappled with the reality of around-the-
clock technological surveillance for the first time.116 The police
suspected Mr. Jones of distributing cocaine. ' As part of their
investigation, they affixed a GPS tracking device to his wife's car
and used it to monitor Jones for twenty-eight days."' The device
allowed the police to establish the car's location within fifty to one
hundred feet, which was then passed on to a government cell
phone.1' Over the four-week period, the GPS relayed in excess of
two thousand pages of data, which was used to convict Jones of
114 See supra Part II-V.
"1 See supra Part III.
116 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
" Id. at 948.
' Id.
1 19 Id.
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multiple drug related offenses.120 Jones appealed his conviction on
the grounds that use of the GPS device constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment.121
It was clear from oral argument that the Justices did not
approve of the Government's conduct. As the exchange between
Chief Justice Roberts and Deputy Solicitor General Michael R.
Dreeben quoted at the beginning of this article made abundantly
clear,122 the Justices did not like what the police had done. Much
of that displeasure seemed to focus on the fact that the Justices
themselves were now vulnerable to government surveillance.123
The conundrum for the Justices, however, was how to find the
GPS monitoring unconstitutional despite existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence.124 Scalia's general antipathy for the Katz two-part
test aside, it is not surprising that he resuscitated the trespass
doctrine,125 as it gave an easy answer to whether the conduct in
question was a search.
It also becomes more understandable why Justice Alito was
willing to argue that the Government's observations of Mr. Jones
constituted a search even though the observations were of conduct
that Jones knowingly exposed to the public.'26 Even if Alito can
appeal to the caveat in Knotts regarding how "dragnet-type law
enforcement practices"'27 might result in a different constitutional
analysis, he still cannot avoid the fact that GPS devices are widely
available. A simple Google search for "GPS tracking device"
came up with over five million hits, with many advertised for less
120 Id. at 948-49.
121 Id. at 949.
122 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 9-10.
123 id.
124 E.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951-53 (distinguishing Jones from United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
12 5 Id. at 949-50.
126 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a
person's movement on public streets accords with expectations privacy that our
society has recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy." (citation omitted)).
127 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1981).
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than $100. 128 Thus, if Alito follows the holdings of Ciraolo, Riley,
and Kyllo, their use by law enforcement should not constitute a
search.
At the same time, it makes sense that it was Sonia
Sotomayor-a Justice with the experience of being both a racial
minority and growing up poorl 29-who was the most comfortable
articulating the limitations of the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. "o
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the Court's technology
jurisprudence can be best understood as protecting the privacy
interests of elites. If this is true, then predicting how the Court will
handle future technology cases may not be so difficult. Right now
it appears that a majority of the Court may be willing to say that
long term GPS tracking is a search even if the tracker was installed
without a physical trespass.'"' Yet if a new counter-tracking device
becomes publically available, one that is extremely expensive but
able to scramble such GPS devices or immediately and irrevocably
delete the information, then the Court may no longer deem such
long-term GPS tracking a search under the Fourth Amendment. In
such a case, the rationale would likely follow that either: (1) if an
individual really had a subjective expectation of privacy, he would
buy such a device to protect himself; or (2) with such a device
available in the marketplace, a reasonable person would not
believe that she would be protected unless she purchased it,
regardless of how much it costs. Whatever the future holds, one
can expect that the protection of the Fourth Amendment will be
dictated to some degree by the biases inherent in human decision-
128 GOOGLE SHOPPING, http://www.google.com/shopping (last visited Feb. 24,
2013) (search for "GPS tracking device").
129 See, e.g., Scott Shane & Manny Fernandez, A Judge's Own Story
Highlights Her Mother's: A Rising Out of Hardship, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2009, at A16.
.o Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
131 Based on the concurrences in Jones, Justices Sotomayor, Alito, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan would constitute this hypothetical majority.
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making, and more particularly, by the special empathies and
interests of the Supreme Court Justices themselves.
487
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 14: 461488
